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Spatial Pillage Game

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Author Info
Jung, Hanjoon Michael

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Abstract

A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from one region to another in one move and can form a coalition and combine their power only with players in the same region. A coalition has power only within its region. Under this spatial restriction, some members of a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4651.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4651

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Related research
Keywords: allocation by force coalitional games pillage game spatial restriction stable set farsighted core

Find related papers by JEL classification:
R19 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Other
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Equilibrium in the Jungle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 883-896, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. A. Muthoo, 2002. "A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights," Economics Discussion Papers 546, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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