Pillage Games with Multiple Stable Sets
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 13-07.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
pillage games; cooperative game theory; core; stable sets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-03-09 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November.
- Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2009. "Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 09-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Alan F. Breardon & Colin Rowat, 2010. "Stable Sets in multi-good pillage games are small," Discussion Papers 10-05, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
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