Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
AbstractThis article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity, defined either on the set of all games, G N , or on the set of essential games, E N (those with a non-empty imputation set). The main result is that for an arbitrary set of players, core selection and aggregate monotonicity are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and symmetry for single-valued solutions defined on both G N and E N . This result solves an open question in the literature (see for example Young et al. Water Resour Res 18:463–475, 1982 ). Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Jens Leth Hougaard & Bezalel Peleg & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2005.
"The Dutta-Ray Solution On The Class Of Convex Games: A Generalization And Monotonicity Properties,"
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- Calleja, Pedro & Rafels, Carles & Tijs, Stef, 2009. "The aggregate-monotonic core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 742-748, July.
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- Kleppe, J., 2010. "Modelling interactive behaviour, and solution concepts," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3763576, Tilburg University.
- Hans Haller & Jean Derks, 1999. "Weighted nucleoli," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 173-187.
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