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Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players

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  • Leandro Rêgo

    ()

  • Joseph Halpern

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-011-0276-8
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 131-155

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:1:p:131-155

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Related research

Keywords: Economic theory; Foundations of game theory; Awareness; Sequential equilibrium; C70; C72;

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References

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  1. Jing Li, 2008. "Modeling Unawareness in Arbitrary State Spaces," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  2. Li, Jing, 2009. "Information structures with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 977-993, May.
  3. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
  4. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  5. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
  6. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  7. Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Games with Incomplete Awareness," Research Papers 1894, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Aviad Heifetz & Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2009. "Unawareness, Beliefs and Speculative Trade," Working Papers 920, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  2. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 2009. "Inductive Reasoning About Unwareness," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151188, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
  3. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper & Aviad Heifetz, 2009. "Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior," Working Papers 910, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  4. Martin Meier & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 219-249, June.
  5. Ernst-Ludwig Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2014. "Multi-task agency with unawareness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 197-222, August.
  6. Salvatore Modica, 2008. "Unawareness, priors and posteriors," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 81-94, November.
  7. Martin Meier & Burkhard Schipper, 2013. "Bayesian Games with Unawareness and Unawareness Perfection," Working Papers 139, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  8. Schipper, Burkhard C, 2011. "Preference-Based Unawareness," MPRA Paper 30221, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Feinberg, Yossi, 2012. "Games with Unawareness," Research Papers 2122, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  10. Heinsalu, Sander, 2014. "Universal type structures with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 255-266.
  11. Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Unawareness - A Gentle Introduction to both the Literature and the Special Issue," Working Papers 145, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  12. Hill, Brian, 2010. "Awareness and equilibrium," Les Cahiers de Recherche 939, HEC Paris.
  13. Ying-Ju Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2013. "Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 508-531, August.

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