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A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

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  • Eric Bahel
  • Christian Trudeau

Abstract

This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit-flow representation similar to that of Wang (Econ Lett 64:187–192, 1999 ). To obtain a characterization of unit flows, we strengthen the dummy axiom and introduce a property that requires the cost share of every agent to be non-decreasing in the incremental costs generated by their demand. Finally, a fairness requirement as to the compensation of technological cooperation is examined. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2013. "A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 439-460, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:439-460
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yves Sprumont, 2005. "On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1693-1712, September.
    2. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2006. "Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 152-188, April.
    3. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 1-35, November.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
    5. J A Aloysius & E C Rosenthal, 1999. "The selection of joint projects by a consortium: Cost sharing mechanisms," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 50(12), pages 1244-1251, December.
    6. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair, 2009. "The private value of a patent: A cooperative approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 84-97, July.
    7. Bergantinos, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007. "A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 326-352, November.
    8. Eric J. Friedman, 2004. "Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 501-518, August.
    9. Moulin, Herve, 1995. "On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 98-99, August.
    10. Friedman, Eric & Moulin, Herve, 1999. "Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 275-312, August.
    11. Wang, YunTong, 1999. "The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 187-192, August.
    12. Trudeau, Christian, 2009. "Cost sharing with multiple technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 695-707, November.
    13. Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Trudeau, Christian, 2014. "Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 137-151.
    2. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2013. "Independence of dummy units and Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation," Working Papers 1304, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    3. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2018. "Stable cost sharing in production allocation games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 25-53, June.
    4. Albizuri, M.J. & Díez, H. & Sarachu, A., 2014. "Monotonicity and the Aumann–Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(2), pages 560-565.
    5. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2018. "Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 737-765, September.
    6. Bahel, Eric & Trudeau, Christian, 2014. "Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 266-269.
    7. Bahel, Eric & Trudeau, Christian, 2019. "A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    8. David Lowing & Kevin Techer, 2022. "Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 815-861, November.
    9. David Lowing & Kevin Techer, 2021. "Marginalism, Egalitarianism and E ciency in Multi-Choice Games," Working Papers halshs-03334056, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost sharing; Demand; Technology; Cooperation; Flow methods; C71; D63;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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