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The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

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  • Marilda Sotomayor, 2011. "The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 631-644, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:3:p:631-644
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0259-1
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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541, Elsevier.
    2. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2005. "An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 298-303, November.
    3. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-137, March.
    4. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2000. "Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 119-132, March.
    5. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    6. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1999. "Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 55-70, July.
    7. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2004. "Implementation in the many-to-many matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 199-212, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2023. "Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 963-994, October.
    2. Niclas Boehmer & Edith Elkind, 2020. "Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences," Papers 2004.14640, arXiv.org.
    3. Agustín G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2024. "Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(1), pages 143-157, March.
    4. Chen, Ning & Li, Mengling, 2013. "Ties matter: improving efficiency in course allocation by introducing ties," MPRA Paper 47031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Naoyuki Kamiyama, 2014. "A New Approach to the Pareto Stable Matching Problem," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(3), pages 851-862, August.
    6. Péter Biró & Elena Inarra & Elena Molis, 2014. "A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1422, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    7. Biró, Péter & Iñarra, Elena & Molis, Elena, 2016. "A new solution concept for the roommate problem: Q-stable matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 74-82.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto-optimal; Stable matching; Pareto-stable matching; Simple matching; Pareto-simple matching; C78; D78;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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