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Citations for "Competitive signalling"

by Riley, John G.

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  1. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2011. "Remittances as a social status signaling device," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 305-318, December.
  2. Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "An economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 271-289, June.
  3. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  4. Kinvi D.A. Logossah, 1994. "Capital humain et croissance économique : une revue de la littérature," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 116(5), pages 17-34.
  5. Andrey Aistov, 2012. "Is Education a Signal on the Russian Labour Market?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 05/EDU/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  6. Andrew Clark, 2000. "Signalling and Screening in a Transition Economy: Three Empirical Models Applied to Russia," CERT Discussion Papers 0003, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
  7. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  8. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Kwang Soo Cheong, 1997. "Corporate Income Taxation and Signaling," Working Papers 199713, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  10. Feldman, David & Winer, Russell S., 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 81-91, July.
  11. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March.
  12. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1989. "Turnover, wages, and adverse selection," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 18-28.
  13. Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005. "Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  14. Milde, Hellmuth & Riley, John G, 1988. "Signaling in Credit Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 101-29, February.
  15. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  16. Bruce D. Smith, 1982. "Human capital investment, and the inefficiency of compensation based on marginal productivity: the static case," Working Papers 205, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  17. Paul W. Miller & Charles Mulvey & Nick Martin, 2004. "A Test of the Sorting Model of Education in Australia," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 04-12, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
  18. Michael Spence, 2002. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June.
  19. John G. Riley, 1984. "Competitive Signalling Reconsidered," UCLA Economics Working Papers 294, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Thakor, Anjan V, 1982. " An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with "Third Party" Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(3), pages 717-39, June.
  21. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2011. "Banks' risk race: A signaling explanation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 784-791, October.
  22. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001035, David K. Levine.
  23. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00424214 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Feldman, David, 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 93-101, July.
  25. Damoiselet, Nathalie, 1998. "Effets des systèmes scolaires sur le comportement éducatif individuel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(1), pages 29-62, mars.
  26. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1985. "Vers une tarification équitable de l’assurance?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(4), pages 453-471, décembre.
  27. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, . "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges.
  28. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2014. "Arranged marriage, education and dowry: A Contract-theoretic perspective," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2014-006, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  29. Gerhard Clemenz & Mona Ritthaler, 1992. "Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 12-26, Spring.
  30. David P. Baron, 1978. "Price Regulation, Quality, and Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  31. Stamland, Tommy, 1999. "Partially Informative Signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 148-161, November.