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Vers une Tarification Equitable de L'assurance

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  • Rochet, J.C.

Abstract

L'intensification de la Concurrence Sur Certains Marches D'assurance a Encourage L'emergence du Principe de la Personnalisation des Primes, Qui S'oppose au Traditionnel Principe de Mutualisation des Risques. Menee a Son Extreme, la Personnalisation Conduirait a une Tarification Equitable de L'assurance, C'est-A-Dire Telle Que la Prime de Chaque Assure Est Exactement Proportionnee au Risque Qu'il Represente. Cet Article Se Propose de Repondre a Deux Question 1) Comment Construire un Tarif Equitable, Compte Tenu de L'imperfection des Criteres a la Disposition de L'assureur? 2) un Tarif Equitable Est-Il Vraiment Souhaitable?

Suggested Citation

  • Rochet, J.C., 1985. "Vers une Tarification Equitable de L'assurance," Cahiers de recherche 8544, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8544
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    6. Quinzii, Martine & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1985. "Multidimensional signalling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 261-284, June.
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    Keywords

    Assurance ; Incertitude;

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