Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gerhard Clemenz

    (University of Regensburg, Germany)

  • Mona Ritthaler

    (University of Regensburg, Germany)

Abstract

We attempt to survey the most important implications of informational asymmetries in credit markets. First, we review the various explanations of equilibrium credit rationing, then we discuss their robustness if collateral and loan size are used as signals of credit worthiness. Then we show the importance of the modelling strategy for the conclusions derived about credit market equilibria. Finally, we discuss the role of different contracts and conclude by suggesting areas of further research.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi/images/stories/fep/f1992_1b.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 5 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 12-26

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:5:y:1992:i:1:p:12-26

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November.
  2. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
  3. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
  4. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(2), pages 133-52, May.
  5. Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection," Discussion Paper Serie A 82, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Baltensperger, Ernst, 1980. "Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking firm," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-37, January.
  7. John G. Riley, 1974. "Competitive Signalling," UCLA Economics Working Papers 050, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  9. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  10. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Kanatas, George, 1985. "Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 84-95, February.
  11. Baltensperger, Ernst, 1978. "Credit Rationing: Issues and Questions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 170-83, May.
  12. Alan S. Blinder, 1985. "Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures," NBER Working Papers 1619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Imperfect Information, Credit Markets and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 2093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  15. Webb, David C, 1981. "The Net Wealth Effect of Government Bonds When Credit Markets are Imperfect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(362), pages 405-14, June.
  16. Smith, Bruce, 1983. "Limited Information, Credit Rationing, and Optimal Government Lending Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 305-18, June.
  17. Williamson, Stephen D, 1986. "Increasing Returns to Scale in Financial Intermediation and the Non-neuturality of Government Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 863-75, October.
  18. Allen, Franklin, 1983. "Credit Rationing and Payment Incentives," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 639-46, October.
  19. Fried, Joel & Howitt, Peter, 1980. "Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(3), pages 471-87, August.
  20. Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle., 1976. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Research Program in Finance Working Papers 41, University of California at Berkeley.
  21. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  22. Chateau, John Peter D., 1983. "Credit rationing as a (temporary) suboptimal equilibrium with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 195-201.
  23. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  24. Bester,Helmut Hellwig,Martin, 1987. "Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues," Discussion Paper Serie A 125, University of Bonn, Germany.
  25. Barro, Robert J, 1976. "The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(4), pages 439-56, November.
  26. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
  27. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  28. Wette, Hildegard C, 1983. "Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 442-45, June.
  29. Guttentag, Jack & Herring, Richard, 1984. " Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(5), pages 1359-82, December.
  30. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, 1988. "Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit," NBER Working Papers 2710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  32. Koskela, Erkki, 1983. "Credit rationing and non-price loan terms : A re-examination," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 405-416, September.
  33. Vandell, Kerry D, 1984. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing: Comment and Extension," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 841-63, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Harhoff, Dietmar, 1996. "Are there financing constraints for R&D and investment in German manufacturing firms?," ZEW Discussion Papers 96-28, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Leonardo Becchetti & Melody Garcia, 2008. "Do collateral theories work in social banking ?," CEIS Research Paper 131, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 07 Nov 2008.
  3. Maher Al-Mahrouq, 2010. "SUCCESS FACTORS OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs): THE CASE OF JORDAN," Anadolu University Journal of Social Sciences, Anadolu University, vol. 10(1), pages 1-16, January.
  4. Buch, Claudia M., 1994. "Insolvency costs and incomplete information in commercial banks: Implications for financial reform in Eastern Europe," Kiel Working Papers 616, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  5. Blackman, Allen, 2001. "Why Don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture?," Discussion Papers dp-01-17, Resources For the Future.
  6. Jobst, Andreas A., 2002. "The Pricing puzzle: The default term structure of collateralised loan obligations," CFS Working Paper Series 2002/14, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  7. Takalo, Tuomas & Toivanen, Otto, 2003. "Equilibrium in financial markets with adverse selection," Research Discussion Papers 6/2003, Bank of Finland.
  8. Andreas A. Jobst, 2002. "Loan securitisation: default term structure and asset pricing based on loss prioritisation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24941, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  9. Parker, Simon C, 2002. "Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should Governments Intervene? President's Lecture Delivered at the Annual General Meeting of the Scottish Economic Society 4-5 September 2001," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 49(2), pages 162-95, May.
  10. Avelino Martínez Sandoval & Harold Londoño Martínez, 2004. "El Racionamiento del Crédito en los Mercados Financieros," REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA Y ADMINISTRACIÓN, UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE OCCIDENTE.
  11. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka, 2010. "Moral hazard in the credit market when the collateral value is stochastic," Research Discussion Papers 22/2010, Bank of Finland.
  12. Annie bellier & Wafa Sayeh & Stéphanie Serve, 2012. "What lies behind credit rationing? A survey of the literature," THEMA Working Papers 2012-39, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  13. Leonardo Becchetti & Melody Garcia & Giovanni Trovato, 2009. "Credit rationing and credit view: empirical evidence from loan data," CEIS Research Paper 144, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Sep 2009.
  14. Helmut Krämer-Eis, 1998. "Evaluierung hoheitlicher Länderrisiken," Working Paper Series B 1998-01, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät.
  15. Andréas Georgiou, 2009. "Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations," IMF Working Papers 09/233, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Vesa Kanniainen & Rune Stenbacka, 1997. "Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-23, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Oct 1998.
  17. Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2000. "Bank mergers and the fragility of loan markets," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 3-18, Spring.
  18. Mälkönen , Ville & Vesala , Timo, 2006. "The adverse selection problem in imperfectly competitive credit markets," Research Discussion Papers 26/2006, Bank of Finland.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:5:y:1992:i:1:p:12-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Secretary).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.