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Effets des systèmes scolaires sur le comportement éducatif individuel

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  • Damoiselet, Nathalie

    (Centre de recherche et développement en économique (C.R.D.E.), Université de Montréal)

Abstract

This article analyses the effects of educational structures on individual educative choices. International studies emphasize the existence of a variety of educative systems and point out the fact that the organization of these systems affects the production of human capital. Paradoxically, it is in the countries where exists a strong willingness for offering a same and equal education to a large body of students that the production of human capital seems to be weaker. A sensible explanation of this fact lies in the additional constraint which caracterizes theses educative systems, because they offer an unique and general curriculum to students who differ in tastes and aptitudes. The purpose of this article is then to formulate a specification of these two types of educative systems in order to shed light on these differences and their effects on individual educative choices. The main result of our model is that the educative systems which offer several curricula inequal in quality are more efficient, in terms of production of human capital and individual profits, than the educative systems which offer an unique and general curriculum, because the latter are more costly for individuals. The additional cost stems from the existence of intermediate standards which impose a same allocation of educative effort on all individuals. Cet article analyse les effets des structures scolaires sur les choix éducatifs individuels. Les études internationales montrent qu’il existe une typologie des systèmes éducatifs et que le mode d’organisation de ces systèmes a une incidence sur la production de capital humain. Paradoxalement, c’est dans les pays où il existe une volonté affichée de faire accéder une majorité d’individus à une éducation unique et égale pour tous que cette production de capital humain semble être plus faible. L’explication la plus intuitive de ce paradoxe est que les systèmes éducatifs de tronc commun sont plus contraignants que les systèmes éducatifs constitués de filières parallèles inégales, parce qu’ils imposent à des individus de goûts et d’aptitudes différents une formation identique, générale et abstraite. Cet article se propose donc de modéliser ces deux catégories de systèmes éducatifs de manière à faire apparaître ces différences et d’examiner quels sont leurs effets sur les choix éducatifs individuels. Le résultat essentiel de notre modélisation est que l’organisation en filières d’un système éducatif est plus efficace, en termes de production de capital humain, mais aussi en termes de profits individuels, parce qu’elle est moins coûteuse pour les individus. En effet, un coût supplémentaire, dans le système de tronc commun, provient des contraintes que représentent les niveaux intermédiaires requis, qui obligent tous les individus à suivre une seule et unique trajectoire de répartition de l’effort scolaire sur l’ensemble de leur cursus.

Suggested Citation

  • Damoiselet, Nathalie, 1998. "Effets des systèmes scolaires sur le comportement éducatif individuel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(1), pages 29-62, mars.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:74:y:1998:i:1:p:29-62
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    2. Spence, Michael, 1974. "Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 296-332, March.
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