Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information
AbstractThis study contributes to the small theoretical literature on human smuggling by assuming for the first time asymmetric information in analysis. The assumption raises the possibility of an adverse selection equilibrium where only exploitative smugglers are employed at a low fee even though migrants are willing to pay nonexploitative smugglers a high fee. More importantly, I find that improved inland apprehension of migrants may increase the incidence of migrant exploitation while failing to decrease smuggling attempts. Furthermore, improved border apprehension of migrants and smugglers may not affect the market at all.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics in its series ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics with number 2013-605.
Length: 20 Pages
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
illegal migration; people smuggling; migrant exploitation; human trafficking; adverse selection;
Other versions of this item:
- Yuji Tamura, 2013. "Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1463-1479, November.
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-03-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IUE-2013-03-23 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-MIG-2013-03-23 (Economics of Human Migration)
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- Djajić, Slobodan & Vinogradova, Alexandra, 2014. "Liquidity-constrained migrants," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 210-224.
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