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Citations for "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games"

by Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M

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  1. Leslie M. Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 1066R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1999. "On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability," Economics Working Papers 408, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
  3. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper & Aviad Heifetz, 2009. "Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior," Working Papers 910, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  4. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games," Research Papers 2021, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  5. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
  6. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
  7. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  8. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society.
  9. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Deductive reasoning in extensive games," Memorandum 08/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  10. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  11. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  12. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.M., 1992. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Working papers 9205, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  13. George J. Mailath, 1996. "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?," Discussion Papers 1161, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Alexia Gaudeul, 2009. "A (Micro) Course in Microeconomic Theory for MSc Students," Working Papers id:1986, eSocialSciences.
  15. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and Common Knowledge," Discussion Paper 1996-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  16. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel, 1998. "Indenturing banknotes as a mechanism to induce cooperation in conflict games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 279-294, February.