Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion
AbstractUnder ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 08-099.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
entry deterrence; access regulation; network infrastructure; vertical differentiation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-02-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2009-02-14 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2009-02-14 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2009-02-14 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2009-02-14 (Regulation)
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