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Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion

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Author Info
Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
Abstract

Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned. --

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 08-099.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7473

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Related research
Keywords: entry deterrence; access regulation; network infrastructure; vertical differentiation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

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