Nomination contests: theory and empirical evidence from professional soccer
AbstractThis paper develops a theory of contests based on perceived abilities, and provides evidence for the predictions of this theory using panel data from professional soccer. We examine how soccer players perform in club matches during the informal)nomination contests for national teams prior to an important international Cup, the Euro 2008. Our differences-in-differences analysis uses players from nonqualified nations who play in the same league as a control group. We find a large positive effect of nomination contest participation on several output measures for players with intermediate chances of being nominated, as proxied by past national team participations. For players with no prior national team experience there is no significant effect. We also find support for the theory that players whose nomination is close to certain reduce their effort in order to avoid injuries or exhaustion prior to the Cup. Finally, any positive reaction is strongest for young players. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 09-027.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-09-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-SPO-2009-09-05 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999.
"Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432, May.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
- Guimarães, Paulo, 2008. "The fixed effects negative binomial model revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 63-66, April.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996.
"Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO,"
_004, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Microeconomics 9602001, EconWPA, revised 09 Oct 1996.
- Garicano, Luis & Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, 2005. "Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful," CEPR Discussion Papers 5231, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Margaret A. MEYER, 1992.
"Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,
ENSAE, issue 25-26, pages 165-187.
- Meyer, Margaret A, 1992. "Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles," CEPR Discussion Papers 637, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Meyer, Margaret A, 1991. "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 15-41, January.
- Kaplan, Steven N. & Reishus, David, 1990. "Outside directorships and corporate performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 389-410, October.
- Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990.
"Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-24, December.
- Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-70, October.
- Orszag, Jonathan M., 1994. "A new look at incentive effects and golf tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 77-88, September.
- Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999.
"Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? Cross-Sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 54(3), pages 875-899, 06.
- Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1996. "Are Some Mutual Funds Managers Better Than Others? Cross-Sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance," NBER Working Papers 5852, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1986.
"Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik & Amit Solomon, 2000. "Security Analysts' Career Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(1), pages 121-144, Spring.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.