IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wzb/wzebiv/spii2003-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Eugenio J. Miravete
  • Lars-Hendrik Röller

Abstract

This paper provides a structural interpretation to the estimates of the shape and position of nonlinear tariffs. We focus on the evaluation of price-cost margins, and thus we need to identify marginal cost from an equilibrium model of nonlinear pricing competition. We estimate these price-cost margins using quarterly data from the early U.S. cellular telephone industry between 1984 and 1988. Our results indicate that the margins are increased under duopoly, due to a significant reduction in marginal costs. Moreover, we find that the price-cost margins vary over the consumption levels and that low end users are subject to higher price-cost margins than high-end users. The impact of competition further increases the margins in the low-end user segment, relative to high endusers. In that sense the benefits of competition, which are largely due to increased efficiencies, are passed on relatively more to high-end users. We also show that these findings are robust even if one includes a number of observable market demand and cost variables. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Schätzung von Preisaufschlägen im nicht-linearen Preissetzungswettbewerb) Dieses Papier bietet eine strukturelle Interpretation der Schätzungen der Form und Position nichtlinearer Tarife. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf die Bewertung von Preisaufschlägen und müssen daher zunächst die Grenzkosten in einem Gleichgewichtsmodell nicht-linearen Preiswettbewerbs identifizieren. Wir schätzen diese Preisaufschläge, indem wir Quartalsdaten der jungen Mobilfunkindustrie der U.S.A. zwischen 1984 und 1988 verwenden. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Aufschläge in einem Duopol aufgrund signifikanter Grenzkostenreduktion größer sind. Außerdem lässt sich feststellen, dass die Preisaufschläge über die Konsumniveaus variieren und dass Nutzer im Niedrigsegment ('low-end') höhere Preisaufschläge zu tragen haben als 'highend'- Nutzer. Der Einfluß des Wettbewerbs vergrößert noch die Preisaufschläge im 'low-end'-Bereich im Vergleich zum 'high-end'. In diesem Sinne profitieren die 'high-end'-Nutzer mehr vom Wettbewerb, der sich vor allem in gesteigerten Effizienzen positiv niederschlägt. Diese Ergebnisse sind robust, wie gezeigt werden kann, sogar wenn eine Reihe beobachtbarer Marktnachfrage- und Kostenvariablen hinzugefügt wird.

Suggested Citation

  • Eugenio J. Miravete & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2003. "Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing Competition," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-21, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-21
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2003/ii03-21.pdf
    File Function: Full text (original version)
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Miravete, Eugenio, 2003. "Competitive Non-Linear Pricing in Duopoly Equilibrium: The Early US Cellular Telephone Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4069, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
    3. Wilson, Robert, 1997. "Nonlinear Pricing," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195115826.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Grajek, Michal & Kretschmer, Tobias, 2009. "Usage and diffusion of cellular telephony, 1998-2004," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 238-249, March.
    2. Xavier D'Haultfœuille & Philippe Février, 2020. "The provision of wage incentives: A structural estimation using contracts variation," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), pages 349-397, January.
    3. Khaled Diaw & Jérôme Pouyet, 2005. "Information, competition and (In) complete discrimination," Working Papers hal-00243025, HAL.
    4. Jean-Pierre Dubé & K. Sudhir & Andrew Ching & Gregory Crawford & Michaela Draganska & Jeremy Fox & Wesley Hartmann & Günter Hitsch & V. Viard & Miguel Villas-Boas & Naufel Vilcassim, 2005. "Recent Advances in Structural Econometric Modeling: Dynamics, Product Positioning and Entry," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 209-224, December.
    5. Pascal Courty & Mario Pagliero, 2012. "The Impact of Price Discrimination on Revenue: Evidence from the Concert Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(1), pages 359-369, February.
    6. Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2011. "Identification of a Class of Adverse Selection Models with Contracts Variation," Working Papers 2011-27, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
    2. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2009. "Competing with Menus of Tariff Options," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 188-205, March.
    3. Miravete, Eugenio, 2004. "Are all those Calling Plans Really Necessary? The Limited Gains From Complex Tariffs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4237, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Katja Seim & V. Brian Viard, 2011. "The Effect of Market Structure on Cellular Technology Adoption and Pricing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 221-251, May.
    5. Rodney Beard, 2015. "N-Firm Oligopoly With General Iso-Elastic Demand," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 336-345, October.
    6. Ciwei Dong & Liu Yang & Chi To Ng, 2020. "Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 37(02), pages 1-32, March.
    7. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    8. McCarthy, Ian M., 2016. "Advertising intensity and welfare in an equilibrium search model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 20-26.
    9. Patrick Bajari & Jeremy Fox & Stephen Ryan, 2008. "Evaluating wireless carrier consolidation using semiparametric demand estimation," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 299-338, December.
    10. Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18.
    12. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2004. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 651-673, Winter.
    13. Lapo Filistrucchi & Tobias J. Klein, 2013. "Price Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers and Network Effects," Working Papers 13-20, NET Institute.
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2005. "Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets," NBER Working Papers 11201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. MITRAILLE Sébastien & MOREAUX Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly," LERNA Working Papers 07.02.223, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    16. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Alexandre de Corniere, 2013. "Search Advertising," Economics Series Working Papers 649, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    18. Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy, 2010. "Vertical merger, collusion, and disruptive buyers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 350-354, July.
    19. Sen, Debapriya & Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2016. "Licensing under general demand and cost functions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(3), pages 673-680.
    20. Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley, 2006. "On a foundation for Cournot equilibrium," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0638, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Estimation of Equilibrium Oligopoly Models; Competitive Nonlinear Pricing; Common Agency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jennifer Rontganger (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cicwzde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.