Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Provision of Wage Incentives : A Structural Estimation Using Contracts Variation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Xavier d'Haultfoeuille

    ()
    (CREST)

  • Philippe Février

    ()
    (CREST)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.crest.fr/images/doctravail/2011-29.pdf
File Function: Crest working paper version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2011-29.

as in new window
Length: 50
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-29

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri 92245 Malakoff Cedex
Phone: 01 41 17 60 81
Web page: http://www.crest.fr
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: incentives; asymmetric information; optimal contracts; nonparametric identification;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Marc IVALDI & David MARTIMORT, 1994. "Competition under Nonlinear Pricing," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 34, pages 71-114.
  2. Miravete, Eugenio J, 2000. "Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans," CEPR Discussion Papers 2635, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  4. Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 1999. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France," IDEI Working Papers 84, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  5. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
  6. Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers, Southern California - Department of Economics 9504, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  7. Adam Copeland & Cyril Monnet, 2003. "The welfare effects of incentive schemes," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 2003-08, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Neeman, Zvika, 2003. "The effectiveness of English auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 214-238, May.
  9. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2009. "Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1193-1227, 07.
  10. repec:bla:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:1:p:93-113 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Misra, Sanjog & Nair, Harikesh, 2009. "A Structural Model of Sales-Force Compensation Dynamics: Estimation and Field Implementation," Research Papers 2037, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  12. Eugenio J. Miravete & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2003. "Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing Competition," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) SP II 2003-21, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  13. Pascal Lavergne & Alban Thomas, 2005. "Semiparametric estimation and testing in a model of environmental regulation with adverse selection," Empirical Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 171-192, January.
  14. Ferrall, Christopher & Shearer, Bruce, 1999. "Incentives and Transactions Costs within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 309-38, April.
  15. Crawford, Gregory S & Shum, Matthew, 2007. "Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 181-219, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Florian Sallaberry).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.