Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Effect of Market Structure on Cellular Technology Adoption and Pricing

Contents:

Author Info

  • Seim, Katja

    (Stanford U)

  • Viard, V. Brian
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We analyze the effect of entry on the technology adoption and calling plan choices of incumbent cellular firms. Focusing on the time period from 1996, when incumbents enjoyed a duopoly market, to 1998, when they faced increased competition from personal communications services (PCS) firms, we relate the adoption of digital technology and change in the breadth of calling plans to the amount of PCS entry experienced in different markets. Variation in geographic features contributes to the difficulty of building a sufficiently large wireless infrastructure network, providing effective instruments for endogenous entry decisions. Our results indicate that incumbents are more likely to upgrade their technology from analog to digital in markets with more entry. Consistent with increased digital technology adoption in more competitive markets, we find that incumbents in the process of digital upgrading also phase out a larger number of analog calling plans and introduce a larger number of digital calling plans in less concentrated markets.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1876R.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1876r.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: May 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1876r

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
    Phone: (650) 723-2146
    Fax: (650)725-6750
    Email:
    Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Hoppe, Heidrun C, 2002. "The Timing of New Technology Adoption: Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidence," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(1), pages 56-76, January.
    2. Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, 2001. "Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence From Radio Broadcasting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 1009-1025, August.
    3. Ron Borzekowski & Raphael Thomadsen & Charles Taragin, 2009. "Competition and price discrimination in the market for mailing lists," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 147-179, June.
    4. Miravete, Eugenio J, 2007. "The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers 6295, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Wilson, Robert, 1997. "Nonlinear Pricing," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195115826.
    6. Oren, Shmuel S. & Smith, Stephen A. & Wilson, Robert B., 1983. "Competitive nonlinear tariffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 49-71, February.
    7. Stole, Lars A, 1995. "Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 529-62, Winter.
    8. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
    9. Gal-Or, Esther, 1988. "Oligopolistic nonlinear tariffs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 199-221.
    10. Spulber, Daniel F., 1989. "Product variety and competitive discounts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 510-525, August.
    11. Miravete, Eugenio J & Röller, Lars-Hendrik, 2003. "Competitive Non-Linear Pricing in Duopoly Equilibrium: The Early US Cellular Telephone Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4069, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Meghan R. Busse, 2000. "Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 287-320, 06.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Kutsal Dogan & Ernan Haruvy & Ram Rao, 2010. "Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 61-90, March.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1876r. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.