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Constructing Social Division to Support Cooperation: Theory and Evidence from Nepal

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  • Choy, James

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

Abstract

Many societies are divided into multiple smaller groups. The defining feature of these groups is that certain kinds of interaction are more likely to take place within a group than across groups. I build a model in which group divisions are enforced through a reputational penalty for interacting with members of different groups. Agents who interact with members of different groups find that they can support lower levels of cooperation in the future. The model explains why agents may be punished by the other members of their group for interacting with members of different groups and why agents are punished for interacting with members of some groups but not others. I test the empirical implication that there should be less cooperation among members of groups that make up a larger percentage of their communities. I discuss the origin and possible future of social division. JEL classification: Cooperation ; Caste ; Social Institution JEL codes: C7 ; O12 ; O17

Suggested Citation

  • Choy, James, 2013. "Constructing Social Division to Support Cooperation: Theory and Evidence from Nepal," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1011, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1011
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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