This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence of roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) shows that most roscas are predominantly composed of women. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household, where husbands and wives have differential savings patterns due to different valuations of an indivisible good. We test the empirical implications of the model using data collected from the Kenyan slum.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.