First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations
AbstractWe consider an augmented version of the symmetric private value auction model with independent types. The augmentation, intended to illustrate reality, concerns information bidders have about their opponents. To the standard assumption that every bidder knows his type and the distribution of types is common knowledge we add the assumption that the ranking of bidders' valuations is common knowledge. This set-up induces a particular asymmetric auction model that raises serious technical difficulties. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies in the two bidder case. We also show that the model generally has no analytic solution. If the distribution of valuations is uniform, both bidders bid pointwise more aggressively relative to the standard symmetric case. However, this property does not apply to all distributions of valuations. Finally, we also provide a numerical solution of equilibrium bid functions for the uniform distribution case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 9701004.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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