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Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal and Asymmetric Information

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Author Info
Hayley Chouinard () (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)
Abstract

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. The equilibria for multiple bidders and a more general value distribution are also presented

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File URL: http://www.ses.wsu.edu/PDFFiles/WorkingPapers/chouinard_rofr.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University in its series Working Papers with number 2006-6.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:chouinard-1

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Related research
Keywords: repeated auction; right of first refusal; asymmetric information;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Natalia Fabra, 2003. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 271-293, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 965-979, June. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hayley H. Chouinard, 2005. "Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 87(4), pages 1083-1088, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir, 1997. "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations," Microeconomics 9701004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Osmundsen, Petter, 1996. "Repeated Auctions of Franchises for Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 183-89, September.
  8. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hayley Chouinard & Jonathan Yoder, 2006. "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal," Working Papers 2006-7, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, revised Jul 2007. [Downloadable!]
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