Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
AbstractThis paper presents a more general independent private value model based on the assumption that Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to make a tradeoff between the probability of winning the unit and the profit under the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. The equilibrium bidding strategies are given and the seller's expected revenue comparisons are made.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 107 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
First-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions Bidding strategy Expected revenue Cobb-Douglas utility function;
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