Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation
AbstractWe study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0402013.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 09 Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 26; figures: included. The most updated version of the paper can be downloaded at www.JohanLagerlof.org.
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lobbying; interest groups; reputation; information transmission; representation; inequality; bias;
Other versions of this item:
- Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," Public Economics 0402003, EconWPA.
- Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johan Lagerlöf & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2004-02-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2004-02-15 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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