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Political and Public Finance Motives for Tariffs

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Author Info
Michael E. S. Hoffman (U.S. Government Accountability Office)

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Abstract

Governments face many constraints when making taxation decisions, including revenue needs, political objectives, and administrative capacities. Tariffs have an appealing combination of features for politicians: they provide a stream of revenue that is easy to collect, as well as satisfying political objectives in import-competing industries. This paper describes the tax structure governments choose when they are not purely benevolent. In the model the government must finance a stream of public expenditures while simultaneously seeking campaign contributions to maximize political support. The predictions of the model are consistent with observed taxation decisions in developing and industrialized countries.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 0510016.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 28 Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0510016

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 34
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: tariffs political economy development tax regimes

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F1 - International Economics - - Trade
F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business

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  5. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Thomas Moutos, 2001. "Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue?," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(1), pages 95-112, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Keiko Kubota, 2005. "Fiscal Constraints, Collection Costs, And Trade Policies," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17, pages 129-150, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Zhihao Yu, 2000. "A model of substitution of non-tariff barriers for tariffs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(4), pages 1069-1090, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Choi, E Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2004. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  13. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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