Fiscal Constraints, Collection Costs, And Trade Policies
AbstractThe last two decades witnessed trade liberalization in many developing countries. What caused this trend, and why have trade barriers been so ubiquitous when economic theory overwhelmingly supports free trade? This paper proposes that governments' revenue needs are the driving force. Governments may rely disproportionately on trade taxes because they are inexpensive to collect. Trade liberalization is an integral part of a tax reform: a tax base expansion is necessary to allow governments to reduce tariff rates. This hypothesis is supported by a panel data analysis of 27 developing countries. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.
Volume (Year): 17 (2005)
Issue (Month): (03)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
Other versions of this item:
- Kubota, Keiko, 2000. "Fiscal constraints, collection costs, and trade policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2366, The World Bank.
- TF0 - - - - - -
- FUN - International Economics - - - - -
- OPE - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - - - -
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