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Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly

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Author Info
Godfrey Keller (London School of Economics)
Sven Rady (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University)

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Abstract

We study the evolution of prices in a symmetric duopoly where firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes perceive the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. Firms learn about their competitive environment from the quantities sold and a background signal. As the informativeness of the market outcome increases with the price differential, there is scope for active learning. In a setting with linear demand curves, we derive firms' pricing strategies as payoff-symmetric mixed or correlated Markov perfect equilibria of a stochastic differential game where the common posterior belief is the natural state variable. When information has low value, firms charge the same price as would be set by myopic players, and there is no price dispersion. When firms value information more highly, on the other hand, they actively learn by creating price dispersion. This market experimentation is transient, and most likely to be observed when the firms' environment changes sufficiently often, but not too frequently.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9810/9810001.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9810001.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 16 Oct 1998
Date of revision: 20 Aug 1999
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9810001

Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on PC; pages: 37 ; figures: included
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Duopoly Experimentation Bayesian Learning Stochastic Differential Game Markov Perfect Equilibrium Mixed Strategies Correlated Equilibrium

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John V, 1993. "Sectoral Shocks, Learning, and Aggregate Fluctuations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(4), pages 777-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1996. "Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1138, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
  5. Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Burdett, Kenneth & Coles, Melvyn G., 1997. "Steady State Price Distributions in a Noisy Search Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-32, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Fishman, Arthur & Rob, Rafael, 1998. "Experimentation and Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 299-320, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Diamond, Peter, 1987. "Consumer Differences and Prices in a Search Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 429-36, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Michael H. Riordan, 1985. "Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 41-50, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Salop, Steven & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 493-510, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Harrington Jr. , Joseph E., 1995. "Experimentation and Learning in a Differentiated-Products Duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 275-288, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Mirman, Leonard J & Samuelson, Larry & Urbano, Amparo, 1993. "Duopoly Signal Jamming," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 129-49, January.
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  13. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1979. "A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 851-58, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Rothschild, Michael, 1974. "A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 185-202, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Mirman Leonard J. & Samuelson Larry & Schlee Edward E., 1994. "Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 363-384, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 1999. "Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 475-507, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Aghion, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz & Jullien, Bruno, 1993. "Dynamic Duopoly with Learning through Market Experimentation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 517-39, July.
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  18. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1996. "Market Experimentation and Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1122, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  19. McLennan, Andrew, 1984. "Price dispersion and incomplete learning in the long run," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 331-347, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Slade, Margaret E, 1989. "Price Wars in Price-Setting Supergames," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(223), pages 295-310, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 1996. "Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 838-68, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Rob, Rafael, 1991. "Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(4), pages 655-75, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2000. "Entry and Vertical Differentiation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1277, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1226, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2001. "Self-Confidence and Survival," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 428, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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