Experimentation and learning with networks effects
AbstractAbtract: This paper considers learning in an imperfectly competitive setting. By allowing an opponent a ``head start," unsuccessful unilateral experimentation may jeopardize future sales and profits. We show that even in the absence of spillover and signalling effects, competition can inhibit the scope of learning, relative to a monopoly.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 44 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
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