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The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation

Author

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  • Michael D. Cohen
  • Rick L. Riolo
  • Robert Axelrod

Abstract

While complex adaptive systems (CAS) theories focus primarily on phenomena such as systemic robustness against perturbation, self-organization, and on the emergence, transformation, and dissolution of organizational entities or action patterns, the metaphorical resonance of CAS work is not easily translated into careful scientific results. It can be very difficult to identify the right level at which to develop more precise theoretical generalizations with well-specified domains of applicability. And constructing experimental parameters that cleanly map to important, general constructs is usually not a simple exercise. This paper demonstrates an approach to this problem. We report results of agent-based simulation experiments in which the basic activity of the agents is to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with other agents. We systematically investigate how the emergence and maintenance of cooperation is affected by variations in three key dimensions: (1) strategy space from which the agents' strategies are selected, (2) the interaction processes that channel agents into interactions, and (3) the adaptive processes that govern the changes in agents' strategies over time. Overall, our experiments both confirm results which have been reported in the literature (e.g., that embedding agents in a 2 dimensional space can lead to the emergence of cooperation), and demonstrate surprising results (e.g., that high levels of cooperation can arise even when agents are randomly mixing, when the agents use simple deterministic strategies and update them using a kind of evolutionary algorithm). Our results also support a generalized view of "neighborhood" where the important factor is the degree to which the interaction processes lead to context preservation, independent of any particular topology. The preservation of context, even as agents are changing their strategies, acts as a "shadow of the adaptive future," resulting in sets of agents who are highly cooperative and resistant to invasion by cheaters. Submitted paper based on above research to Rationality and Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael D. Cohen & Rick L. Riolo & Robert Axelrod, 1999. "The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation," Working Papers 99-01-002, Santa Fe Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:wop:safiwp:99-01-002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cohen, Michael D., 1981. "The power of parallel thinking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 285-306, December.
    2. Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring," Nature, Nature, vol. 393(6685), pages 573-577, June.
    3. Joshua M. Epstein, 1997. "Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma," Working Papers 97-12-094, Santa Fe Institute.
    4. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    5. Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
    6. Joshua M. Epstein, 1997. "Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma," Research in Economics 97-12-094e, Santa Fe Institute.
    7. Robert Hoffmann & Nigel Waring, 1996. "The Localisation of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Working Papers 96-08-064, Santa Fe Institute.
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    2. Nicholas M. Gotts & J. Gareth Polhill, 2009. "When and How to Imitate Your Neighbours: Lessons from and for FEARLUS," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(3), pages 1-2.
    3. Bill Tomlinson, 2009. "A Proximate Mechanism for Communities of Agents to Commemorate Long Dead Ancestors," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(1), pages 1-7.
    4. Suzanne Van Brussel & Luuk Boelens & Dirk Lauwers, 2016. "Unravelling the Flemish Mobility Orgware: the transition towards a sustainable mobility from an actor-network perspective," European Planning Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(7), pages 1336-1356, July.
    5. Alan G. Isaac, 2008. "Simulating Evolutionary Games: A Python-Based Introduction," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(3), pages 1-8.
    6. Takama, Takeshi & Preston, John, 2008. "Forecasting the effects of road user charge by stochastic agent-based modelling," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 738-749, May.
    7. Daniela Nepote & Sylvie Occelli, 2003. "Beyond core-periphery relationship in the EC cooperation," ERSA conference papers ersa03p218, European Regional Science Association.
    8. Frank Schweitzer & Laxmidar Behera, 2012. "Optimal Migration Promotes The Outbreak Of Cooperation In Heterogeneous Populations," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(supp0), pages 1-27.
    9. Tackseung Jun & Rajiv Sethi, 2009. "Reciprocity in evolving social networks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 379-396, June.
    10. Luis R. Izquierdo & Segismundo S. Izquierdo & José Manuel Galán & José Ignacio Santos, 2009. "Techniques to Understand Computer Simulations: Markov Chain Analysis," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(1), pages 1-6.
    11. Sutee Anantsuksomsri & Nij Tontisirin, 2016. "A spatial agent-based model of a congestion game: evolutionary game theory in space," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 57(2), pages 371-391, November.
    12. M.G. Zimmermann, V. M. Eguiluz, 2001. "Evolution of Cooperative Networks and the Emergence of Leadership," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 171, Society for Computational Economics.
    13. Christina Fang & Steven Orla Kimbrough & Stefano Pace & Annapurna Valluri & Zhiqiang Zheng, 2002. "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 11(6), pages 449-467, November.
    14. Lars-Erik Cederman, 2001. "Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(4), pages 470-502, August.
    15. Conrad Power, 2009. "A Spatial Agent-Based Model of N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Cooperation in a Socio-Geographic Community," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(1), pages 1-8.

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