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A spatial agent-based model of a congestion game: evolutionary game theory in space

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  • Sutee Anantsuksomsri

    (Chulalongkorn University
    Waseda University)

  • Nij Tontisirin

    (Thammasat University)

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze traffic congestion from a micro-behavioral foundation perspective. It extends the evolution of an n-person prisoner’s dilemma within actual geographical space, integrating an agent-based model with GIS, in conflicting spatial interactions that ultimately lead to the decline of cooperation. The spatial agent-based model captures the response strategies of autonomous individuals in a landscape that contextualizes both the natural and the built environment. The result suggests that the loss of context preservation could lead to the extinction of cooperation, the opposite of the earlier findings. This theoretical framework thus serves as a basis for the analysis of collective strategic decisions about the use of a common resource from a game theoretical perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Sutee Anantsuksomsri & Nij Tontisirin, 2016. "A spatial agent-based model of a congestion game: evolutionary game theory in space," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 57(2), pages 371-391, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:anresc:v:57:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s00168-016-0770-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00168-016-0770-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Levinson, David, 2005. "Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 39(7-9), pages 691-704.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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