The evolution of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma depends on the conditions under which the game is played. The results of a series of computer simulations show that the emergence of cooperative play in the game is strongly affected by the localisations of both interaction and learning. While the localisation of learning promotes mutual cooperation, the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it. Moreover, the localisation of learning seems to promote disequilibrium behaviour in the system.
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Paper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Working Papers with number
96-08-064.
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