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How much to commit to an exchange rate rule : balancing credibility and flexibility

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  • Cukierman, Alex
  • Kiguel, Miguel A.
  • Liviatan, Nissan

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to identify the factors which determine the strength of commitment that policymakers choose to back up a fixed exchange rate system. In practice the commitment level is achieved by choosing a particular set of monetary and exchange rate arrangements. The authors develop a Barro-Gordon type model in which the policymaker has to decide how much to commit under uncertainty. An important assumption is that the stronger the commitment to the fixed exchange rate the greater the political cost of reneging on it. Thus, prior to deciding on the choice of exchange rate arrangements the policymaker has to weigh the benefits, to the disinflation program, from making a strong commitment against the potential costs of being forced to renege on it. Some of the more technical details are presented in appendices. The paper illustrates the results of the model with examples from Latin American countries and concludes with a comparison of the results of the authors approach with related work.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 931.

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Date of creation: 31 Jul 1992
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:931

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Related research

Keywords: Economic Stabilization; Macroeconomic Management; Economic Theory&Research; Fiscal&Monetary Policy; Foreign Trade Promotion and Regulation;

References

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  1. Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1989. "Monetary Policy Strategies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 612-632, September.
  2. Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus & Marshall, Jorge, 1991. "Macroeconomics of public sector deficits : the case of Chile," Policy Research Working Paper Series 696, The World Bank.
  3. Fischer, Stanley, 1982. "Seigniorage and the Case for a National Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 295-313, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Cukierman, Alex & Spiegel, Yossi & Leiderman, Leonardo, 2004. "The choice of exchange rate bands: balancing credibility and flexibility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 379-408, March.
  2. Ball, R., 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of Monetary Commitment: A Comparative Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 1821-1842, October.
  3. Isriya Nitithanprapas & Thomas D. Willett, 2002. "Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes," Claremont Colleges Working Papers, Claremont Colleges 2002-22, Claremont Colleges.

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