Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Dynamic climate policy with both strategic and non-strategic agents : taxes versus quantities

Contents:

Author Info

  • Karp, Larry
  • Siddiqui, Sauleh
  • Strand, Jon

Abstract

This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a"fringe"of non- strategic (emerging and developing) countries which both consume and produce fossil fuels. Cumulated emissions over time from global fossil fuel consumption create climate damages which are considered by both the strategic importer and the non-strategic countries. Markov perfect equilibria are examined under the four combinations of trade policies and compared with the corresponding static games where climate damages are given (not stock-related). The main results are that taxes always dominate quota policies for both the strategic importer and exporter and that"fringe"countries bene?t from a tax policy as compared with a quota policy for the strategic importer, as the import fuel price then is lower, and the strategic importer's fuel consumption is also lower, thus causing fewer climate damages.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/10/28/000158349_20131028131355/Rendered/PDF/WPS6679.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 6679.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6679

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Climate Change Economics; Markets and Market Access; Debt Markets; Emerging Markets;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Amundsen, E.S. & Schob, R., 1999. "Environmental Taxes on Exhaustible Resources," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen 192, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  2. Tower, Edward, 1975. "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 623-30, October.
  3. Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2009. "A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent," CESifo Working Paper Series 2741, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Matthias Kalkuhl & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2010. "Prices vs. Quantities and the Intertemporal Dynamics of the Climate Rent," CESifo Working Paper Series 3044, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Santiago J. Rubio, 2005. "Tariff Agreements And Non-Renewable Resource International Monopolies: Prices Versus Quantitites," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2005-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Liski, Matti & Tahvonen, Olli, 2004. "Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-12, January.
  7. Franz Wirl, 1995. "The exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes: A dynamic game approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(4), pages 333-352, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6679. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.