Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources
AbstractEnvironmental problems are tied to the use of exhaustible resources. A resource tax extracts rents from the resource owning countries, whitout creating significant incentives for consumers to reduce their resource consumption. The placement of the tax burden on resource owners affects the international distribution of wealth. In this paper we show that it is optimal for small countries who do not coordinate their national environmental policies, to impose a time-variant Pigovian tax.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
Other versions of this item:
- Amundsen, E.S. & Schob, R., 1999. "Environmental Taxes on Exhaustible Resources," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 192, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
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