Corruption and Positive Selection in Privatization
AbstractWe consider the supply of a public good based on a publicly-owned facility. The Government has a choice between provision in-house and privatizing the facility and then outsourcing the production. In particular, we focus on corruption in the decision to privatize and on its effect on social welfare when there is asymmetric information on the public and private manager's efficiency. Our analysis shows that a corrupt Government, that chooses to privatize only in exchange for a bribe, makes a positive selection on the private firm's efficiency and, thus, may raise expected social welfare above what an honest Government could get.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2008_43.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia
Web page: http://www.unive.it/dip.economia
More information through EDIRC
Corruption; Privatization; Private vs. public provision.;
Other versions of this item:
- Buia, Raluca E. & Molinari, M. Cristina, 2012. "Corruption and positive selection in privatization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(4), pages 297-304.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-01-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAW-2009-01-03 (Law & Economics)
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