Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Corruption in Privatization and Governance Regimes

Contents:

Author Info

  • Maria Cristina Molinari

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari)

Abstract

We consider the choice to privatize the provision of a public good in a hierarchical model with three layers: a Central Government, a decentralized agency and a (private or public) manager. In a good governance regime the privatization can be devolved upon the decentralized agency while it cannot when the governance is bad. There are two types of information asymmetries: managers are privately informed of their efficiency in reducing costs (and quality) and only the decentralized agency knows the social cost of a lower grade good. We show that corruption is always detrimental to welfare when governance is good but it could be beneficial otherwise.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.unive.it/media/allegato/DIP/Economia/Working_papers/Working_papers_2011/WP_DSE_molinari_28_11.pdf
File Function: First version, anno
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 201_28.

as in new window
Length: num pagine 18
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2011_28

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia
Phone: +39-0412349621
Fax: +39-0412349176
Email:
Web page: http://www.unive.it/dip.economia
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Governance regimes; Corruption; Privatization; Positive selection.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Raluca E. Buia & M. Cristina Molinari, 2008. "Corruption and Positive Selection in Privatization," Working Papers 2008_43, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  2. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December.
  3. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
  4. DE LA CROIX, David & DELAVALLADE, Clara, 2006. "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," CORE Discussion Papers 2006101, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  6. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 63, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  7. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
  8. Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 2008. "Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 245-263, July.
  9. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2005. "Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 69-97, January.
  10. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Soreide, Tina, 2005. "Corruption and privatization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 903-914, December.
  11. Axel Dreher & Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, 2007. "Corruption Around the World: Evidence from a Structural Model," Discussion Papers 0702, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  12. Glaeser, Edward L. & Saks, Raven E., 2006. "Corruption in America," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1053-1072, August.
  13. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Laurent Weill, 2005. "Does better governance foster efficiency? An aggregate frontier analysis," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8368, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  14. George Emm Halkos & Nickolaos Tzeremes, 2010. "Corruption and Economic Efficiency: Panel Data Evidence," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(4), pages 441-454.
  15. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World," IMF Working Papers 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
  17. Douglas A. Houston, 2007. "Can Corruption Ever Improve an Economy?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 27(3), pages 325-342, Fall.
  18. Heckelman, Jac C. & Powell, Benjamin, 2008. "Corruption and the Institutional Environment for Growth," Working Papers 2008-6, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
  19. Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009. "Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
  20. Aidt, Toke & Dutta, Jayasri & Sena, Vania, 2008. "Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-220, June.
  21. Sanjit Dhami & Ali Al-Nowaihi, 2007. "Corruption and the Provision of Public Output in a Hierarchical Asymmetric Information Relationship," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 727-755, 08.
  22. Egger, Peter & Winner, Hannes, 2005. "Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 932-952, December.
  23. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
  24. Vial, Virginie & Hanoteau, Julien, 2010. "Corruption, Manufacturing Plant Growth, and the Asian Paradox: Indonesian Evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 693-705, May.
  25. Albert Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes, 2004. "Privatization in Latin America: What Does the Evidence Say?," JOURNAL OF LACEA ECONOMIA, LACEA - LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.
  26. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
  27. Axel Dreher & Thomas Herzfeld, 2005. "The Economic Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New Evidence," Public Economics 0506001, EconWPA.
  28. Albert de Vaal & Wouter Ebben, 2011. "Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and Economic Growth," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 108-123, 02.
  29. Mendez, Fabio & Sepulveda, Facundo, 2006. "Corruption, growth and political regimes: Cross country evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 82-98, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2011_28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Geraldine Ludbrook).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.