The Diffusion of Policy Innovations. An Experimental Investigation
AbstractWhat causes a government to adopt a new program or policy? Despite a large number of empirical studies available to date, the relative importance of various determinants remains obscure because of difficulties of statistical identification. We present an experimental setting to study the diffusion of policy innovations in the laboratory. Our approach discriminates between experimentation, experience, and emulation as determinants of policy adoption. The policy innovation we study is an internalization tax to mitigate a local market externality. Our results demonstrate the importance of information about innovations in other states in the diffusion of policy innovations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003 with number 2003-14.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision:
Policy emulation; policy experimentation; innovation;
Other versions of this item:
- Jean-Robert Tyran & Rupert Sausgruber, 2005. "The diffusion of policy innovations -an experimental investigation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 423-442, October.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBE-2003-07-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2003-07-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-INO-2003-07-13 (Innovation)
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