Political Uncertainty and Policy Innovation
AbstractConventional wisdom has it that outside sources of information enhance the capability of political institutions to separate selfish from benevolent incumbents. This paper investigates, in the presence of innovative public policies whose outcomes are uncertain, the role of outside information and shows that it is more involved than typically thought. While it is true that enhanced information helps in separating politicians, it also creates an externality that reduces the incentives to experiment with innovative public policies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0111.
Date of creation: Dec 2001
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Policy uncertainty; Political uncertainty; Fiscal federalism; Policy innovation; Experimentation.;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
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