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A theory of informational autocracy

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  • Guriev, Sergei
  • Treisman, Daniel

Abstract

We develop an informational theory of autocracy. Dictators survive not by means of force or ideology but because they convince the public—rightly or wrongly—that they are competent. Citizens do not observe the leader's type but infer it from signals in their living standards, state propaganda, and messages sent by an informed elite via independent media. If citizens conclude that the leader is incompetent, they overthrow him. The dictator can invest in making convincing state propaganda, censoring independent media, co-opting the elite, or equipping police to repress attempted uprisings—but he must finance such spending at the expense of the public's consumption. We show that informational autocracies prevail over old-style, overtly violent dictatorships when the informed elite is sufficiently large but are replaced by democracies when elites are too numerous to be bribed or censored. The theory provides insight into various soft authoritarian regimes around the world and suggests a logic of modernization behind recent global political trends.

Suggested Citation

  • Guriev, Sergei & Treisman, Daniel, 2020. "A theory of informational autocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720300220
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104158
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    Cited by:

    1. Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2022. "Media access, bias and public opinion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    2. Miller, Marcus, 2022. "Deep historical roots, culture choice and the New World Order," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1414, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Felipe González & María Angélica Bautista, & Luis R. Martínez & Pablo Muñoz & Mounu Prem, 2020. "Chile’s Missing Students: Dictatorship, Higher Education and Social Mobility," Documentos de Trabajo 542, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    4. Vakhtang Putkaradze, 2023. "The Dictator Dilemma: The Distortion of Information Flow in Autocratic Regimes and Its Consequences," Papers 2310.01666, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    5. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," NBER Working Papers 27949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Sergei Guriev & Daniel Treisman, 2019. "Informational Autocrats," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 100-127, Fall.
    7. Park, Hyungmin, 2023. "Developmental Dictatorship and Middle Class-driven Democratisation," QAPEC Discussion Papers 20, Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre.
    8. Fabio Blasutto & David de la Croix, 2023. "Catholic Censorship and the Demise of Knowledge Production in Early Modern Italy," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(656), pages 2899-2924.
    9. Miller, Marcus & ,, 2021. "Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 16695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Papers 2111.00992, arXiv.org.
    11. Schulze, Günther G. & Zakharov, Nikita, 2023. "Political cycles of media repression," BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2023, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    12. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
    13. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2021. "Economic liberalization, political regimes and ideology," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 463-487, November.
    14. Bautista, María Angélica & González, Felipe & Martinez, Luis R. & Muñoz, Pablo & Prem, Mounu, 2020. "Dictatorship, Higher Education, and Social Mobility," SocArXiv 6st9r, Center for Open Science.
    15. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2108, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.
    16. Choy, James P., 2020. "Kompromat: A theory of blackmail as a system of governance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).

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