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Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control

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  • Scott Gehlbach
  • Alberto Simpser

Abstract

Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Gehlbach & Alberto Simpser, 2015. "Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(1), pages 212-224, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:1:p:212-224
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12122
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Jancsics & Salvador Espinosa & Jonathan Carlos, 2023. "Organizational noncompliance: an interdisciplinary review of social and organizational factors," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 1273-1301, September.
    2. Kwan Nok Chan & Shiwei Fan, 2021. "Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1406-1418, October.
    3. Guriev, Sergei & Treisman, Daniel, 2020. "A theory of informational autocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    4. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "The Political Economics of Non-democracy," NBER Working Papers 27949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    6. Frye, Timothy & Borisova, Ekaterina, 2016. "Elections, protest and trust in government: A natural experiment from Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2016, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    7. Ananyev, Maxim & Poyker, Michael, 2022. "Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    8. Andrew T Little, 2017. "Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 214-242, April.
    9. Edmond, Chris & Lu, Yang K., 2021. "Creating confusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    10. Chris Edmond & Yang K Lu, 2018. "Creating Confusion "Abstract: We develop a model in which a politician seeks to prevent people from making informed decisions. The politician can manipulate information at a cost, but cannot comm," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2043, The University of Melbourne.
    11. Schulze, Günther G. & Zakharov, Nikita, 2023. "Political cycles of media repression," BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2023, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    12. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2016. "Participation in fraudulent elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 863-892, April.
    13. A. Georges L. Romme & Harry van de Loo & Ben Dankbaar, 2022. "How to Control Civil Servants: Designing and Testing a Solution Informed by Game Theory," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-17, April.
    14. Raphael Boleslavsky & Mehdi Shadmehr & Konstantin Sonin, 2021. "Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1782-1815.
    15. David Szakonyi & Ora John Reuter, 2020. "Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support: Survey Evidence from Russia," Working Papers 2020-19, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    16. Haseeb, Muhammad & Vyborny, Kate, 2022. "Data, discretion and institutional capacity: Evidence from cash transfers in Pakistan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    17. Hao Hong & Tsz-Ning Wong, 2020. "Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 460-493, July.
    18. Xinyu Fan & Feng Yang, 2019. "Strategic promotion, reputation, and responsiveness in bureaucratic hierarchies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 286-307, July.
    19. Muhammad Haseeb & Kate Vyborny, 2016. "Imposing institutions: Evidence from cash transfer reform in Pakistan," CSAE Working Paper Series 2016-36, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    20. Little, Andrew T., 2017. "Propaganda and credulity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 224-232.
    21. repec:zbw:bofitp:2016_009 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Frye, Timothy & Borisova, Ekaterina, 2016. "Elections, protest and trust in government: A natural experiment from Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2016, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.

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