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Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions

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  • Kollman, Ken
  • Miller, John H
  • Page, Scott E
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    Abstract

    We use mathematical and computational models to analyze the ability of federated organizations to solve difficult problems. Federated organizations may have some inherent advantages for solving difficult problems since they can empower multiple subunits to search for policy solutions in parallel and exploit and combine the mutual information discovered by the subunits to reveal even better solutions. We find that the benefits of these methods of experimentation first increase and then decrease as the problem of finding good policies increases in difficulty. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

    Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 102-28

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:102-28

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    Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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    Cited by:
    1. Andreas Wagener, 2009. "Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2723, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Jan Schnellenbach, 2008. "Rational Ignorance is not Bliss: When do Lazy Voters Learn from Decentralised Policy Experiments?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 228(4), pages 372-393, August.
    3. Rincke, Johannes, 2005. "Neighborhood Influence and Political Change: Evidence from US School Districts," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-16, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    4. Kotsogiannis, Christos & Schwager, Robert, 2006. "On the incentives to experiment in federations," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 484-497, November.
    5. Chang, Myong-Hun & Harrington, Joseph Jr., 2006. "Agent-Based Models of Organizations," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 1273-1337 Elsevier.
    6. Jean-Robert Tyran & Rupert Sausgruber, 2005. "The diffusion of policy innovations -an experimental investigation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 423-442, October.
    7. Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, 2005. "Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200506, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    8. Page, Scott E. & Tassier, Troy, 2007. "Why chains beget chains: An ecological model of firm entry and exit and the evolution of market similarity," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3427-3458, October.
    9. Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "An Optional European Contract Law Code: Advantages and Disadvantages," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200607, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    10. Henning Klodt & Oliver Lorz, 2008. "The coordinate plane of global governance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 29-40, March.
    11. Kerber, Wolfgang & Eckardt, Martina, 2005. "Policy learning in Europe: The 'open method of coordination' and laboratory federalism," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 48, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    12. Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, . "Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competition Laws," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1090, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    13. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2005. "Policy Innovation In Federal Systems," Urban/Regional 0504001, EconWPA.

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