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Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?

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Author Info
Strumpf, Koleman S
Abstract

The conventional wisdom is that government decentralization promotes policy innovation because it allows for several simultaneous experiments by local governments. However, this ignores a learning externality: successful policy experiments provide useful information for all governments. Local governments will ignore this externality, but a central government should take it into account. This article uses a social learning model to compare policy innovation under centralization and decentralization. Centralization leads to more policy innovation if the local governments are relatively homogeneous or large in number. However, decentralization may induce more policy innovation if there are multiple experimental policies available. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

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Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 207-41
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:2:p:207-41

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  1. Johannes Rincke, 2006. "Policy innovation in local jurisdictions: Testing for neighborhood influence in school choice policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 189-200, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2005. "On the Incentives to Experiment in Federations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2004. "Federalism, Decentralization, and Economic Growth," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200430, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  4. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004. "Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance: Evidence from Swiss Cantons," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200420, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  5. Amihai Glazer & Hiroki Kondo, 2007. "Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions," Working Papers 070807, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2005. "Policy Innovation In Federal Systems," Urban/Regional 0504001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Axel Dreher, 2006. "Power to the People? The Impact of Decentralization on Governance," KOF Working papers 06-121, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rincke, Johannes, 2005. "Policy Innovation in Local Jurisdictions : Testing the Neighborhood Influence Against the Free-Riding Hypothesis," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-08, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Naohiro Yashiro, 2005. "Japan’s New Special Zones for Regulatory Reform," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 561-574, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Giampaolo Garzarelli, 2005. "Cognition, Incentives, and Public Governance:Laboratory Federalism from the Organizational Viewpoint," Public Economics 0512013, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2003. "Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 361-377.
  12. Jean-Robert Tyran & Rupert Sausgruber, 2003. "The Diffusion of Policy Innovations. An Experimental Investigation," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003 2003-14, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
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