Retiree Health Benefits as Deferred Compensation: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study
AbstractAre early retiree health benefits (RHBs) a form of deferred compensation that binds workers to an employer? Most employers who offer RHBs offer them only to workers who have 10 or more years of tenure with the firm and have reached age 55. Accordingly, workers in firms offering RHBs have an incentive to stay with a firm in the years before they attain eligibility for RHBs, and a greater incentive than otherwise to retire thereafter. We test for the existence of such a pattern of incentives by examining the age-specific relationship between workers’ eligibility for RHBs and retirement. The findings suggest that workers in RHB-offering firms are less likely to retire at ages 50 and 51 than similar workers in firms that do not offer RHBs. Also, RHB-eligible workers aged 60 and 61 are more likely to retire than similar RHB-ineligible workers. Such a pattern is consistent with RHBs acting as part of a delayed-payment contract of the kind described by Lazear (1979, 1981).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in its series Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles with number 12-182.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Tax Subsidies; Health Insurance; Retirement; Employee Benefits; Deferred Compensation; Compensation Methods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2012-07-08 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2012-07-08 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2012-07-08 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2012-07-08 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2012-07-08 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
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- Nyce, Steven & Schieber, Sylvester J. & Shoven, John B. & Slavov, Sita Nataraj & Wise, David A., 2013.
"Does retiree health insurance encourage early retirement?,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 40-51.
- Steven Nyce & Sylvester Schieber & John B. Shoven & Sita Slavov & David A. Wise, 2011. "Does Retiree Health Insurance Encourage Early Retirement?," NBER Working Papers 17703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Maria D. Fitzpatrick, 2013.
"Retiree Health Insurance for Public School Employees: Does it Affect Retirement?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4415, CESifo Group Munich.
- Maria D. Fitzpatrick, 2013. "Retiree Health Insurance for Public School Employees: Does it Affect Retirement?," NBER Working Papers 19524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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