Entry limiting agreements: First mover advantage, authorized generics and pay-for-delay deals
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- Farasat A. S. Bokhari & Franco Mariuzzo & Arnold Polanski, 2020. "Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage, authorized generics, and pay‐for‐delay deals," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 516-542, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
pharmaceuticals; pay-for-delay; reverse payments; authorized generics; first mover advantage;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2020-09-07 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2020-09-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2020-09-07 (Law and Economics)
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