IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ijecbs/v22y2015i2p201-217.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Newton's First Law as Applied to Pharmacies: Why Entry Order Matters for Generics

Author

Listed:
  • Ali Shajarizadeh
  • Paul Grootendorst
  • Aidan Hollis

Abstract

The first generic entrant into Canadian pharmaceutical markets has a surprisingly durable impact on market share: consistent with past research, we show that first entrants have a boost of roughly 25% in their expected market share some six years after entry. There appears to be considerable inertia in pharmacies' choice of which generic drug to stock. In this article, we empirically explore possible explanations for this puzzling phenomenon, including reputation, pharmacy "gratitude," patient resistance to switching, and transactions costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Shajarizadeh & Paul Grootendorst & Aidan Hollis, 2015. "Newton's First Law as Applied to Pharmacies: Why Entry Order Matters for Generics," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 201-217, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:22:y:2015:i:2:p:201-217
    DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2015.1045746
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13571516.2015.1045746
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/13571516.2015.1045746?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Farasat A. S. Bokhari & Franco Mariuzzo & Arnold Polanski, 2020. "Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage, authorized generics, and pay‐for‐delay deals," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 516-542, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:22:y:2015:i:2:p:201-217. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CIJB20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.