“Branded Generics” As A Strategy To Limit Cannibalization Of Pharmaceutical Markets
AbstractThis paper demonstrates how, by introducing a generic version of its previously-patented product, a branded firm can influence the equilibrium in the generic segment of the market for the product. This in turn can increase the firm’s profits from selling the branded version. We then use structural estimates from previous literature to calculate the magnitude of the effects in the generic and branded segments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Texas at Arlington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0502.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Pharmaceuticals; Generic Drugs; Oligopoly; Strategy;
Other versions of this item:
- David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, 2007. "'Branded Generics' as a strategy to limit cannibalization of pharmaceutical markets," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4-5), pages 251-265.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1997. "Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, 03.
- Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1997. "Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals," NBER Working Papers 5306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ivan Moreno-Torres, 2011. "Generic drugs in Spain: price competition vs. moral hazard," Working Papers XREAP2011-04, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised May 2011.
- Iván Moreno-Torres & Jaume Puig-Junoy & Joan-Ramon Borrell, 2009. "Generic Entry into the Regulated Spanish Pharmaceutical Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 373-388, June.
- Appelt, Silvia, 2010. "Authorized Generic Entry prior to Patent Expiry: Reassessing Incentives for Independent Generic Entry," Discussion Papers in Economics 11476, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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