Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device
AbstractThis paper hypothesizes that, when their products are imperfect substitutes, firms can promote collusion by cross-licensing their competing patents. Cross-licensing is shown to enhance the degree of collusion achieved in a repeated game by credibly introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the market for each firm's product. The paper then examines the consistency of the theory developed with the available evidence. Antitrust implications of the practice of cross-licensing of competing patents are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
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- Katharine Rockett, 2009. "Property Rights and Invention," Economics Discussion Papers 663, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain)
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