Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge
AbstractWe study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may 'enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting affects the need for patent protection. Our results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) The inventor offers contracts which allow resale of the knowledge acquired by the imitators; (iii) As the pool of potential imitators grows large, the inventor may become a permanent monopolist.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7511.
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Other versions of this item:
- Emeric Henry & Carlos J. Ponce, 2011. "Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(5), pages 959 - 981.
- Carlos J. Ponce & Emeric Henry, 2009. "Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/c8dmi8nm4pd, Sciences Po.
- Carlos J. Ponce & Emeric Henry, 2011. "Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-11-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2009-11-27 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-11-27 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-KNM-2009-11-27 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-TID-2009-11-27 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ashish Arora & Andrea Fosfuri & Alfonso Gambardella, 2004. "Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262511819, June.
- B. Douglas Bernheim, 1984. "Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, Spring.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
- Arundel, Anthony, 2001. "The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 611-624, April.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 1985. "Innovation and Imitation in a Duopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 99-106, January.
- Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea, 2003.
"Licensing the market for technology,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 277-295, October.
- Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea, 2003. "Licensing the market for technology," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/13388, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea, 1999. "Licensing the Market for Technology," CEPR Discussion Papers 2284, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003.
"Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not),"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000624, David K. Levine.
- Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March.
- Gallini, Nancy T, 1984. "Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 931-41, December.
- Katharine E. Rockett, 1990. "Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 161-171, Spring.
- Tuomas Takalo, 2012.
"Rationales and Instruments for Public Innovation Policies,"
Journal of Reviews on Global Economics,
Lifescience Global, vol. 1, pages 157-167.
- Takalo, Tuomas, 2009. "Rationales and Instruments for Public Innovation Policies," Discussion Papers 1185, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Takalo , Tuomas, 2013. "Rationales and instruments for public innovation policies," Research Discussion Papers 1/2013, Bank of Finland.
- Henry, Emeric & Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco, 2012.
"Innovation Beyond Patents: Technological Complexity as a Protection against Imitation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8870, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francisco Ruiz Aliseda & Emeric Henry, 2013. "Innovation beyond Patents: Technological Complexity as a Protection against Imitation," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2013-06, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Rousakis, Michael, 2012. "Implementation Cycles : Investment-Specific Technological Change and the Length of Patents," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 983, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.