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Sistemas de patentes para fomentar la innovacion: lecciones de analisis economico

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  • David Encaoua

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Dominique Guellec

    (OCDE - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques)

  • Martinez Catalina

    (IPP - Instituto de politicas y Bienes Publicos - Centrode Ciencias Humanas y Sociales, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas)

Abstract

La teoría económica, al considerar que las patentes son instrumentos de política pública para fomentar la innovación y la difusión de la tecnología, conduce principalmente a tres conclusiones. En primer lugar, las patentes no tienen por qué ser siempre el medio de protección más eficaz para que los inventores recuperen sus inversiones en I+D, sobre todo cuando la imitación es costosa y ser el primero en lanzar un producto al mercado genera ganancias importantes. En segundo lugar, los requisitos de novedad y altura inventiva para la concesión de patentes deberían aplicarse de forma estricta para evitar que se concedan patentes para invenciones de escaso valor social, que sólo aumentan el coste social del sistema de patentes. En tercer lugar, los parámetros de longitud (duración legal) y amplitud (ámbito de protección) de las patentes podrían utilizarse para incentivar el desarrollo de invenciones con alto valor social. Más allá de estas tres implicaciones, la teoría económica aboga asimismo por enfocar la política de patentes desde el punto de vista del diseño de mecanismos de incentivos: un sistema de patentes óptimo podría basarse en un menú con diferentes grados de protección, donde una mayor protección implicaría tarifas más elevadas, y donde los inventores podrían elegir por sí mismos el nivel de protección que deseen, pagando la tarifa correspondiente.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00743037.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Publication status: Published, Economia de la innovacion y desarollo, siglo veintiuno, siglo xxi editores, mexico (Ed.), 2011, 398-430
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00743037

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00743037
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Keywords: patentes; mecanismos de incentivos;

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  1. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 1996. "Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 60-83, Spring.
  2. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2002. "The Case Against Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000003, David K. Levine.
  3. Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
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  6. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring.
  7. Gallini, Nancy & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt9wx2c2hz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  8. Aghion, Philippe & Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1997. "Competition and growth with step-by-step innovation: An example," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 771-782, April.
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  10. Merges, Robert P. & Nelson, Richard R., 1994. "On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, September.
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  12. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000624, David K. Levine.
  14. Mazzoleni, Roberto & Nelson, Richard R., 1998. "The benefits and costs of strong patent protection: a contribution to the current debate," Research Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 273-284, July.
  15. Robert M. Hunt, 1999. "Nonobviousness and the incentive to innovate: an economic analysis of intellectual property reform," Working Papers 99-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  16. van Dijk, Theon, 1996. "Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 151-67, June.
  17. Kortum, Samuel & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "What is behind the recent surge in patenting?1," Research Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-22, January.
  18. Kenneth Carow, 1999. "Evidence of Early-Mover Advantages in Underwriting Spreads," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 37-55, February.
  19. Hellwig, Martin & Irmen, Andreas, 1999. "Endogenous Technical Change in a Competitive Economy," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 99-53, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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