Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ying Kong

    ()
    (Department of Economics, The University College of Cariboo, Kamloops, BC, Canada V2C SN3. Tel.: +1-250-828-5000)

  • James R. Seldon
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection.Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs.The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0889-938X/contents
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

    Volume (Year): 25 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 1 (08)
    Pages: 71-86

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:71-86

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, 2007. "'Branded Generics' as a strategy to limit cannibalization of pharmaceutical markets," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4-5), pages 251-265.
    2. Regan, Tracy L., 2008. "Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the prescription drug market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 930-948, July.
    3. Paul Grootendorst, 2007. "Effects of 'Authorized-Generics' on Canadian Drug Prices," Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population Research Papers 201, McMaster University.
    4. de Vries, A.G.B. & Pennings, H.P.G. & Block, J.H., 2013. "Trademark or patent? The effects of market structure, customer type and venture capital financing on start-ups' IP decisions," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2013-002-STR, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    5. Marjit, Sugata & Kabiraj, Tarun & Dutta, Arijita, 2009. "Strategic Under-utilization of Patents and Entry Deterrence: The Case of Pharmaceutical Industry," MPRA Paper 19157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ying Kong, 2009. "Competition between brand-name and generics - analysis on pricing of brand-name pharmaceutical," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 591-606.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:71-86. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.