This paper examines the price effects of generic drugs that are produced by brand-name drug firms and that are labeled, priced, and marketed to compete against independent generics. The strategy of introducing such “pseudo-generics” – also known as “authorized generics” – has raised some antitrust concerns. One defense of this strategy has been that the additional competition created by pseudo-generics should lead to lower prices. This paper develops a simple model to show that pseudo-generics can be expected to have exactly the opposite effect. It then examines empirical evidence on this point from the Canadian pharmaceutical market, showing that there appears to be a positive relationship between drug prices and the share of generic sales made by the brand’s own pseudo-generic. Copyright Springer 2005
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 27 (2005) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 329-350 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF